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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 3 
 It is our second time hearing this case on appeal.  
Elizabeth Harvey originally brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 against Officer Ronald Dombroski and other 
defendants for the allegedly unconstitutional search of her 
apartment in the context of her ex-boyfriend‟s repossession of 
property.  Officer Dombroski was at the scene of the 
repossession serving to maintain the peace, and there was a 
question as to whether he took an active role in the 
repossession or remained neutral.  The District Court initially 
ruled in favor of all the defendants on summary judgment, 
and we reversed with respect to Officer Dombroski in holding 
that there was a material factual dispute as to whether 
Dombroski acted under color of state law.  Harvey v. Plains 
Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Harvey I”).  
On remand, the District Court conducted a jury trial and, at 
the conclusion of the two-day trial, provided a verdict form 
that limited the state action issue to a single factual question:  
whether Dombroski ordered Harvey‟s door to be opened.  
The jury found in the negative, and Harvey lost. 
 We find that the verdict form was in error.  Action 
under color of state law must be addressed after considering 
the totality of the circumstances and cannot be limited to a 
single factual question.  For the foregoing reasons, we will 
vacate and remand this case to the District Court for a new 
trial. 
I. 
 At one point, Elizabeth Harvey and Edward Olowiany 
jointly leased an apartment from Joan Chukinas, their 
landlord.  The relationship between Harvey and Olowiany 
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ended, and Harvey received a protection from abuse order 
(“PFA”), which granted her exclusive possession of the 
apartment and ordered Olowiany to retrieve all of his 
belongings immediately after entry of the PFA.  Olowiany did 
just that, but later that month, Olowiany‟s lawyer mailed 
Harvey a letter seeking permission to return to retrieve 
additional items.  Harvey ignored the letter.  Two weeks later, 
a second letter was sent.  Harvey claims that she was away 
from her apartment and did not receive the second letter.  In 
the meantime, Olowiany attempted to repossess the additional 
property and sought police presence to maintain the peace. 
 Officer Dombroski was dispatched by the Plains 
Township Police Department and arrived at Harvey‟s 
apartment at 2:00 p.m. on a weekday.  Olowiany and his 
friend Tina George arrived five minutes later, as did Chukinas 
with a key to the apartment.  Harvey was not home.  They 
waited for thirty minutes, at which point they began 
discussing ways to obtain access to Harvey‟s apartment.  
Dombroski testified that Chukinas asked him whether it 
would be permissible to open Harvey‟s door: 
I said to her, based on what I had known from 
my supervisor and the letters I had seen [from 
Olowiany‟s lawyer] . . . I can‟t see a problem 
with it, everyone got the letter and that was it.  I 
never told her to open the door. . . . I told Joan 
[Chukinas] I could not see a problem with it 
because I believed everybody got the letter. 
(App. at 243.)  Chukinas testified that “the policeman okayed 
me to open the door” (id. at 41-42) and that she “would have 
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never opened the door if I didn‟t have permission from the 
policeman.”  (Id. at 35-36.)  After Chukinas opened Harvey‟s 
door, Dombroski and Olowiany entered the apartment.  
Olowiany left with several items, and Harvey arrived later 
that day to find her apartment “in shambles.”  (Id. at 123-24.) 
 Harvey originally brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 against Officer Dombroski, Police Chief Edward 
Walsh, the Plains Township Police Department, the Plains 
Township Board, and Joan Chukinas for the unconstitutional 
search of her apartment.  The District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor 
of all the defendants.  On appeal, we reversed the District 
Court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer 
Dombroski and remanded the case.  Harvey I, 421 F.3d at 
187. 
 The District Court held a jury trial.  At the conclusion 
of the trial, the Court instructed the jurors as to Harvey‟s 
§ 1983 claim.  It instructed that action under color of state law 
means “that the plaintiff must show that the defendant was 
using power that he possessed by virtue of state law.”  (App. 
at 302.)  The Court went on to note that, “in order to 
determine if the . . . plaintiff established her Section 1983 
claim, you must answer only one factual question, and that is 
did the defendant order the landlady to open the door to the 
apartment.”  (Id.)  The District Court also provided a verdict 
form with the first question reading as follows: 
1) Did Defendant Ronald Dombroski act under 
color of state law with regard to the re-
possession of personal property at Plaintiff 
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Elizabeth Harvey‟s apartment on September 18, 
1999?  Only answer “Yes” if you find that 
Defendant Ronald Dombroski ordered the 
landlord to open the door of the apartment. 
____ Yes    ____ No 
If you answered “No” please sign and date the 
verdict form and return to the courtroom.  If you 
answered “Yes” proceed to question 2. 
(Id. at 315.)  Harvey failed to raise objections to the jury 
instructions or verdict form, and the jury answered “No” to 
the first question.  Harvey now appeals with the assistance of 
amicus curiae for whom we thank for its service.
1
 
II. 
 Because Harvey failed to raise an objection to the jury 
instructions or verdict form, we conduct plain error analysis.  
Under Rule 51, we “may consider a plain error in the 
instructions that has not been preserved . . . if the error affects 
substantial rights.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2).  We must 
therefore consider whether the District Court committed an 
error and, if it did, whether the error affected Harvey‟s 
substantial rights. 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1343.  We have jurisdiction over Harvey‟s 
timely appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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A. 
 To prevail on a § 1983 claim, Harvey had to show, 
first, that she was deprived of a constitutional right and, 
second, that the alleged deprivation was “committed by a 
person acting under color of state law.”  Harvey I, 421 F.3d at 
189 (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).  The 
first element was not in dispute.  The case turned on whether 
Harvey could prove that Dombroski acted “under color of 
state law.”2  42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 Action under color of state law “requires that one 
liable under § 1983 have exercised power possessed by virtue 
of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is 
clothed with the authority of state law.”  Abbott v. Latshaw, 
164 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  We have considered state action in the 
context of private repossessions before.  The test is whether 
the officer maintains neutrality or takes an active role in the 
repossession resulting in an unconstitutional deprivation.  Id. 
at 147.  “The mere presence of police at the scene of a private 
repossession does not, alone, constitute state action.”  Id.  An 
                                              
2
 The terms “under color of state law” and “state 
action” are used interchangeably.  Where deprivations of 
rights under the  Fourteenth Amendment are alleged against 
state officials, these two requirements converge.  Lugar v. 
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982); Abbott v. 
Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 1998) (“If . . . conduct 
satisfies the state action requirement of the Due Process 
Clause, then it also qualifies as action „under color of state 
law‟ for § 1983 purposes.”). 
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officer‟s presence may be requested to maintain the peace, 
and the officer appropriately does so by remaining neutral.  
An officer abandons neutrality once he takes an active role 
and assists in the repossession. 
 The relevant inquiry, then, is whether an officer 
affirmatively aided a repossession such that he can be said to 
have caused the constitutional deprivation.  Such aid may 
take the form of facilitation, encouragement, direction, 
compulsion, or other affirmative assistance in the 
repossession.
3
  See Marcus v. McCollum, 394 F.3d 813, 819 
(10th Cir. 2004).  However, liability will only attach when an 
                                              
3
 Relevant circumstances may include whether the 
officer: 
 
[1] accompanied the private party onto the scene, 
[2] told the debtor that the seizure was legal, 
[3] ordered the debtor to stop interfering or he would 
go to jail,  
[4] intervened at more than one step in the 
repossession process,  
[5] failed to depart before the repossession has been 
completed, 
[6] stood in close proximity to the creditor, [or]  
[7] unreasonably recognized the documentation of one 
party over the other[.] 
 
Price-Cornelison v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103, 1117 (10th Cir. 
2008) (citing Marcus v. McCollum, 394 F.3d 813, 819 (10th 
Cir. 2004)). 
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officer plays a “principal role” in the seizure.  Abbott, 164 
F.3d at 147.  In short, an officer may be liable for causing a 
constitutional deprivation if he “aid[s] the repossessor in such 
a way that the repossession would not have occurred but for 
[his] assistance.”  Marcus, 394 F.3d at 819. 
 The distinction between maintaining neutrality and 
taking an active role is not to be answered in the abstract.  
There is no precise formula, and the distinction lies in the 
particular facts and circumstances of the case.  See Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (“Only 
by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the 
nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be 
attributed its true significance.”).  To determine whether a 
police officer acted under the color of state law, the facts and 
circumstances of the police officer‟s role in the private 
repossession must be examined in their totality.  See 
Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 At one point, the District Court in our case instructed 
the jury correctly: 
The crucial inquiry is whether the police officer 
was, one, present simply to stand in case there 
was a breach of the peace or whether the police 
officer was, two, taking an active role and 
affirmatively assisted in the repossession. 
(App. at 308.)  But, as noted, the Court also incorrectly stated 
that “in order to determine if the . . . plaintiff established her 
Section 1983 claim, you must answer only one factual 
question, and that is did the defendant order the landlady to 
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open the door to the apartment.”  (Id. at 302.)  Importantly, 
the verdict form explicitly limited the factual inquiry to a 
single question:  whether “Dombroski ordered the landlord to 
open the door of the apartment.”  (Id. at 315.) 
 We find that the jury instructions and verdict form 
were in error.  They precluded a full investigation of the facts 
and circumstances.  Whether there was action under color of 
state law is dependent upon the role played by Dombroski in 
the repossession.  The state action question must be addressed 
after considering the totality of the circumstances and cannot 
be limited to a single factual question. 
Applying the totality of the circumstances test, a 
reasonable jury could have found that Dombroski intervened 
and aided Olowiany so as to cause the constitutional 
violation.  Dombroski went to the scene of the repossession at 
Olowiany‟s behest, implied the search was legal by telling the 
landlord it was all right to open the door, entered the 
apartment to observe Olowiany remove items, stayed until 
repossession was complete, followed immediately behind 
Olowiany during the seizure, unreasonably recognized 
Olowiany‟s documentation – a letter prepared by Olowiany‟s 
attorney purporting to list all the items which belonged to 
Olowiany – even though Harvey was not present to contest 
the information in the letter, and attempted to mark off the 
items as Olowiany took them.  The verdict form prevented the 
jury from considering these relevant facts and circumstances. 
 Dombroski offers three replies.  First, he argues that 
the presence of the plaintiff at the scene of the repossession is 
a “crucial” factor in finding state action.  Because Harvey was 
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not present at the scene of the allegedly unconstitutional 
search, argues Dombroski, we cannot find state action.  We 
rejected this argument in Harvey I, where we did “not read 
[case law] as embracing a rule that requires the plaintiff‟s 
presence in order to find state action.”  421 F.3d at 191.  For 
the same reason we reject Dombroski‟s first argument. 
 Second, Dombroski argues that the verdict form 
conformed with the facts of the case and the theory of liability 
advanced by Harvey.  He cites numerous statements by 
Harvey‟s counsel in opening and closing statements that 
Dombroski “ordered” the landlord to open the door.  “At no 
time,” argues Dombroski, “did Harvey contend or argue that 
Chukinas opened the door to the apartment because she was 
coerced, intimidated, or otherwise[] caused to open the door 
against her will.”  (Dombroski Br. at 13.)  We find to the 
contrary.  In his closing argument, Harvey‟s counsel stated: 
We have a police officer who as an authority 
figure, just as a mother or father is an authority 
figure.  And if the mother or father says to the 
child, it‟s okay to open the door . . . the person 
is going to respond because that is basically an 
acceptance by the authority figure to go ahead 
and do it.  This is implied if anything else, you 
go ahead and open the door.  He had no 
authority to allow her to open the door.  That 
was not in his permissive area as a police 
officer.  That amounted to police action on his 
part. 
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(App. at 289.)  Even if Harvey‟s primary argument was that 
Dombroski ordered Chukinas to open the door, her counsel 
also argued and introduced evidence showing that 
Dombroski‟s intervention caused Chukinas to open the door.  
Harvey was entitled to the correct verdict form and jury 
instructions.  See Hilord Chem. Corp. v. Ricoh Elecs., Inc., 
875 F.2d 32, 38 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 Third, Dombroski argues that the instructions and 
verdict form were in conformity with our opinion in Harvey I.  
In a footnote, we stated, 
It is a much different question whether state 
action could be found if Chukinas asked 
Dombroski if she could open the door and he 
assented (such that there was no official order to 
open the door).  The cases above suggest that 
Dombroski‟s mere assent to opening the door, 
provided that the choice to open the door 
remained with Chukinas, would not qualify as 
state action. 
Harvey I, 421 F.3d at 191 n.6.  The mere fact that Dombroski 
approved Chukinas‟s opening the door is insufficient to 
establish state action.  Indeed, mere approval is not state 
action as long as “the choice to open the door remained with 
Chukinas.”  Id.  However, the verdict form prevented the jury 
from reaching a determination of whether the choice to open 
the door in fact remained with Chukinas.  Considering the 
totality of the circumstances, the jury may have determined 
that Dombroski played an active role in the repossession. 
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B. 
 An error constitutes plain error if:  “(1) [the error is] 
fundamental and highly prejudicial or if the instructions are 
such that the jury is without adequate guidance on a 
fundamental question and (2) our failure to consider the error 
would result in a miscarriage of justice.”  Alexander v. Riga, 
208 F.3d 419, 426-27 (3d Cir. 2000).  A jury instruction, 
taken as a whole, must inform the jury of the correct legal 
standard.  Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, 
949 F.2d 1241, 1259 n.15 (3d Cir. 1991).  When a jury 
instruction is erroneous, a new trial is warranted unless such 
error is harmless.  See Advanced Med., Inc. v. Arden Med. 
Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 188, 199 (3d Cir. 1992).  An error is 
harmless if it is “highly probable” that the error did not 
contribute to the judgment.  Id.  An erroneous jury instruction 
may also be considered non-fundamental when, taking the 
instructions as a whole, the erroneous instruction is a “solitary 
misstatement of law” buried in an otherwise correct legal 
explanation.  Ryder v. Westinghouse Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 137 
(3d Cir. 1997). 
 The jury instructions and the verdict form contained 
fundamental, highly prejudicial errors that went beyond 
minor misstatements of the law.  While the instructions 
included part of the correct legal standard for state action in 
the context of a repossession, the Court stated that if the jury 
found that “Dombroski did not direct or order[] the landlady 
to open the door,” then he did not act under the color of state 
law and the jury must return a verdict for the defendant.  
(App. 308-09.)  This error was reinforced by the verdict form, 
which forced the outcome of the case to be determined by a 
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single finding of fact:  whether Dombroski ordered the 
landlord to open the door.  In Hurley v. Atlantic City Police 
Department, we held that the District Court failed to instruct 
the jury that punitive damages against the upper management 
of a company could only be awarded if upper management 
was involved in the violation.  174 F.3d 95, 122-24 (3d Cir. 
1999).  We reversed the finding of punitive damages because 
the jury instructions “failed to provide proper guidance for the 
jury on a fundamental question.”  Id. at 124; see also 
Beardshall v. Minuteman Press Int’l, 664 F.2d 23, 26 (3d Cir. 
1981) (holding that the District Court‟s failure to instruct the 
jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error).  
The District Court in this case did not merely omit an 
instruction but instructed the jury incorrectly.  As a result, the 
jury conducted an improper finding of fact and reached an 
unsound conclusion.  The jury was unable to exercise its fact-
finding function to fully consider the facts and circumstances.  
If the Court had provided a proper verdict form, the jury may 
have reached a different result.  The jury may have found that 
Dombroski played an active role in the repossession, even if 
he did not order the landlord to open Harvey‟s door.  The 
District Court‟s error was, therefore, fundamental because it 
affected the central element in dispute, and it was prejudicial 
because the jury may have reached a different result. 
 Second, the failure to consider the District Court‟s 
error would result in a miscarriage of justice.  The central 
issue in dispute at the trial was the role played by Officer 
Dombroski, and Harvey may have lost entirely because of the 
Court‟s erroneous verdict form.  Though this is a 
discretionary power that we should exercise sparingly, we 
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believe that finding plain error is appropriate in this case.  See 
Hurley, 174 F.3d at 124 (stating that failure to consider a 
jury-instruction error omitting an element of a claim “would 
result in a miscarriage of justice”); Choy v. Bouchelle, 436 
F.2d 319, 325 (3d Cir. 1970) (holding that failure to consider 
an improper jury instruction would constitute a miscarriage of 
justice). 
IV. 
 Because we will vacate the order of the District Court, 
we need not address the additional claims raised by Harvey in 
her brief.  For the aforementioned reasons, we will vacate and 
remand this case to the District Court for a new trial. 
